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Abstract
We develop a new way to test hypotheses about policymakers’ targets, and imple-
ment that test for Canadian monetary policy. For example, if the Bank of Canada is
targeting a 2 percent inﬂation rate, and if the Bank’s instrument takes 8 quarters to
aﬀect inﬂation, then deviations of inﬂation from 2 percent should be uncorrelated
with the Bank’s information set lagged 8 quarters. We show there was a major
change in the Bank’s objectives near the time when formal inﬂation targets were
announced, and that the Bank has indeed been targeting inﬂation since then.
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1. Introduction
In February 1991, the Bank of Canada announced a new policy of inﬂation
targeting. In this paper, we test whether this announcement reﬂected a change in
the actual behaviour of the Bank of Canada, and whether the Bank has indeed been
targeting inﬂation since the announcement.
The objectives of a policy authority are not generally fully known: even if they
are clearly stated, tactical considerations may lead to a divergence between stated
and actual objectives.1 The objective of a policy authority can be thought of as
the targeting of a particular macroeconomic variable (hereafter called the target
variable) towards some level. For example, a central bank may attempt to target
output to equal potential output, or alternatively target a constant inﬂation rate.
The standard approach to testing hypotheses about a central bank’s objectives
is to estimate a policy reaction function. There is a growing literature2 where
economists try to estimate these reaction functions, usually as variants on a Taylor
rule, for various monetary authorities around the world. The dependent variable
of the estimated equation is the bank’s policy instrument, while the independent
variables include possible target variables and indicators of those target variables. A
variant to the standard approach attempts to identify the policymaker’s underlying
preferences.3
In this paper, we develop a new way to test hypotheses about what variable a
policy authority is targeting, and we apply our test to the Bank of Canada. Our test
turns the standard approach on its head. The standard approach can be thought of
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as looking for where the monetary authority’s gun is pointing; our approach looks
for where the bullets are hitting. According to this analogy, if we have correctly
identiﬁed the monetary authority’s target, then deviations of the bullets from the
target should be random errors that are uncorrelated with any information available
to the monetary authority when it pulled the trigger.
Hall (1978) proposed a way to test Friedman’s Permanent Income Hypothesis:
if individuals with rational expectations seek to smooth consumption over time,
then changes in consumption between periods t and t + 1 should be uncorrelated
with anything in the individual’s information set at time t. Our test is similar
in spirit to Hall’s test. We show that if a policymaker is using an instrument to
target a variable and there is a j period lag in the eﬀect of the instrument on
the target variable, then deviations of the target variable from the target at time
t + j should be uncorrelated with anything in the policymaker’s information set at
time t, including inter alia the instrument itself. In practice, one major diﬀerence
between our test and Hall’s is that we use a lagged information set, to reﬂect the
lag with which the policy instrument aﬀects the target variable, whereas Hall uses
a contemporaneous information set, to reﬂect the assumption that consumption is
chosen contemporaneously. Econometrically, this means that the residuals in Hall’s
test should be serially uncorrelated, while the residuals in our test will be serially
correlated, because our policymaker’s required forecasting horizon is longer than
our sampling frequency.
Kuttner and Posen (1999) come closest to the test proposed here. Starting
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from the standard Barro-Gordon model of central bank behaviour, they derive and
estimate both a reaction function and an inﬂation forecasting equation. Indeed,
they recognise in passing that under strict inﬂation targeting, deviations of inﬂation
from target should be unforecastable, which is analogous to our test that deviations
should be uncorrelated with the monetary authority’s information set. But their
inﬂation forecasting equation diﬀers from our implicit forecasting equation in two
important ways. First, they use only a one quarter lag in their forecasting equation
(and indeed their model assumes, quite unrealistically, that the central bank can
choose inﬂation contemporaneously), while we allow a six or eight quarter lag to take
into account the conventional view that it takes six or eight quarters for changes in
the central bank’s instrument to have its maximum impact on the rate of inﬂation.
Second, while Kuttner and Posen use only lagged inﬂation and unemployment in
their inﬂation forecasting equation, our own method is based on the premise that
no variable in the central bank’s information set should provide any information
on deviations of inﬂation from target. We therefore use a larger set of variables in
our test. As a result of these diﬀerences between the two approaches, our results
also diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those of Kuttner and Posen. We discover signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the objectives of the Bank of Canada between the pre- and post-
inﬂation targeting periods, while they ﬁnd none.
As an aside, we also note here that our result casts doubt on the validity of
existing empirical causality tests. Suppose, for example, that monetary policy is
chosen to target output to follow a smooth path over time and that monetary policy
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does indeed aﬀect output with a (say) six quarter lag. If that policy is successful,
output ﬂuctuations will be uncorrelated with a six-quarter lagged information set,
and econometric money-output causality tests will reject the hypothesis that money
causes output. What others have interpreted as evidence against money-output
causality could therefore also be interpreted as evidence of successful output tar-
geting. The same applies to money-inﬂation causality tests if monetary policy is
chosen to target inﬂation.4
We describe the statistical framework in Section 2, the method for empirical
testing in Section 3, results in Section 4, and conclusions in Section 5.
2. Statistical Framework
Suppose that a policymaker is trying to target X using the policy instrument
Z, where X is a scalar and Z is a vector. Suppose further that the policy instrument
acts on X with a lag of j periods, so that in terms of the underlying reduced form,
Xt+j = F (Zt, ...). (1)
The target variable Xt+j may be decomposed into its rational expectation condi-
tional on all information available to the policymaker at time t plus some error
term,
Xt+j = E(Xt+j |It) + et+j . (2)
Note that by deﬁnition of rational expectations, the random error term et+j must
be uncorrelated with everything in the policymaker’s information set, It. And
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assuming that the policymaker knows the value of its own instrument at time t, the
instrument Zt will be included in the information set It.
Suppose for example that the objective of the policymaker is to target X such
that it follows a time trend. That is, for some B, representing the desired rate of
growth of the target variable,
X∗t = Bt. (3)
Given the lag between changes in the instrument and its eﬀect on the target, plus
the policymaker’s imperfect information, exact targeting is impossible to achieve.
Instead, the best the policymaker can do is to make the rational expectation of
the target variable follow a time trend at and beyond the control lag (j). The
policymaker therefore sets the instrument Zt such that
E(Xt+j |It) = B(t + j). (4)
Assuming that the probability distribution of Xt+j around its expectation is sym-
metric and that the loss function of the policy authority is quadratic, this policy
rule will minimize the variance of Xt+j around its trend and hence minimize the
expected loss. Substituting equation (4) into the decomposition identity given by
equation (2) yields
Xt+j = B(t + j) + et+j . (5)
This equation is empirically testable; if equation (5) holds, deviations of X about
its trend should be uncorrelated with any variable in the policymaker’s information
set at time t, including inter alia all current and lagged values of the instrument,
{Zt, Zt−1, ...}.
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To illustrate the intuition behind our approach, suppose the structure of the
economy can be represented by
Xt+j = BZt + GUt + et+j , (6)
where B, G, are ﬁxed parameters and known to the policymaker, Xt is inﬂation,
Zt is the policy instrument, Ut is some other variable that aﬀects inﬂation and is
observed by the monetary authority, and et is an unforecastable, mean zero, error
term.
If the bank targets a constant inﬂation rate of C, it will choose its instrument
according to the policy reaction function
Zt =
C −GUt
B
. (7)
Substituting the reaction function into equation (6), we get
Xt+j = C + et+j . (8)
The inﬂation rate will equal a constant, plus an error term. Implementing our test
of the hypothesis that the bank is targeting a constant rate of inﬂation, we would
expect to discover that neither the policy instrument, Zt, the exogenous indicator,
Ut, nor both variables together, are correlated with deviations of inﬂation from the
target, since neither will be correlated with the error term et+j . Furthermore, the
high (or indeed perfect) multicollinearity between the independent variables (Ut
and Zt) will make it diﬃcult (impossible) to identify the coeﬃcients B and G in
structural equation (6), thereby invalidating empirical causality tests. Empirical
causality will be rejected even when, by assumption, it exists.
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We directly test equation (8) using tests of overidentifying restrictions, as in
Hansen (1982). Even if the independent variables (those in the policymaker’s in-
formation set) are highly collinear, our inference should not be aﬀected. Whether
the econometrician uses all of the information available to the monetary authority
or only a subset of that information, if the bank targets a constant inﬂation rate,
the implied overidentiﬁcation restrictions should not be rejected. More generally,
equation (5) can be replaced by any time path for the target variable desired by the
policymaker, X∗t , and the corresponding errors tested.
In testing equation (5) or (8), we are testing a joint hypothesis of (i) the
policymaker’s desired time path for the target variable, (ii) rational expectations
on the part of the policymaker, (iii) correct knowledge by the policymaker of the
structure of the economy, and (iv) the lag length with which the policy instrument
is assumed to aﬀect the target variable.
Clearly, the desired time path for the target variable must be feasible. For
example, if the policymaker tried to use monetary policy to make real output grow
permanently faster than potential output growth, we should not expect equation (5)
to hold. But then a policymaker with rational expectations and correct knowledge
of the structure of the economy would not try to achieve an unattainable target.
Our method of testing for targeting is very general, and requires no assumption
about any particular underlying model of the economy. There are many diﬀerent
combinations of policymakers, policy instruments, and target variables for which the
test could be implemented. We illustrate how our test can be applied by focusing
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on one example, the Bank of Canada.
3. Empirical Testing
We now test various hypotheses about what the Bank of Canada was seeking to
target over the past 30 years. Since our method assumes that the target is a single
scalar variable, we compare a number of mutually exclusive hypotheses about what
that target was, for any given period of time. For example, we can test whether the
Bank was targeting solely inﬂation, and we can test whether the Bank was targeting
solely output, but we cannot test whether the Bank was targeting both inﬂation
and output over the same period.
The time period we consider coincides with the longest available data panel:
from the second quarter of 1968 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2001. We use this quarterly
data to test the overidentifying restrictions implied by a variety of possible hypoth-
esised targets on a small number of key macroeconomic variables that economic
theory suggests should be important in explaining future movements in the target
variables. In principle, our method allows any variable whatsoever (provided it is in
the Bank’s information set) to be considered as a potential forecaster of deviations
from a hypothesised target. But in practice, degrees of freedom constrain us to
consider only those variables that one might expect to be useful a priori.
To test for inﬂation targeting, the dependent variable is the deviation of the
growth rate of the core consumer price index (GCPIX) from its target. GCPIX is
the measure of inﬂation that the Bank of Canada uses as a near-term operational
target, and is constructed using overall CPI excluding food, energy, and indirect
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taxes. The variables included in the Bank of Canada’s information set are: lags
in GCPIX; lags in the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GRGDP); lags
in the growth rate of narrow money (GM1); and lags in the interest rate on 90
Day Commercial Paper (CP). Because of the limited degrees of freedom available,
we include 4 lags on each of the variables in the Bank’s information set. CP is
used because it is an interest rate on which monetary policy has an immediate and
predictable impact. The mechanism by which monetary policy is implemented has
changed over the last 30 years, making the Bank Rate and Overnight Rate less
suitable. Other variables also considered were the percent change in the nominal
exchange rate with the United States (E) and alternative measures of the interest
rate, including measures of the term structure. The results reported in Section 4
are robust to these choices.
To test for output growth targeting, the dependent variable is deviations of
GRGDP from its target. The variables included in the Bank of Canada’s informa-
tion set are: lags in CP (and alternative measures of interest rates); lags in the
percent change in the real exchange rate with the United States (RE); and lags in
GRGDP itself.
We use two diﬀerent sampling approaches to test hypotheses about possible
targets of the Bank of Canada. Our ﬁrst approach uses tests of overidentifying
restrictions over (2-sided) rolling samples, adding and dropping one observation each
time. Each rolling sample consists of 36 consecutive quarters of data. Our second
approach uses tests over the full sample, but allowing for endogenous break-points
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in the target using Andrews (1993), and incorporating robust variance-covariance
estimation using Newey and West (1987).
The advantage of our ﬁrst approach (rolling samples) is that it allows for
changes in the economic structure or the policymaker’s target to evolve continu-
ously over time, whereas the second approach (full sample with structural breaks)
allows only for discrete breaks in the economic structure or policymaker’s target.
(Strictly speaking, we should also have used the original data as it became available,
rather than ﬁnal revised data, but doing so was impractical). We also use 1-sided
rolling samples as warranted, to determine whether it is the addition of new data
or the loss of old data that drives changes in the test statistic over the sample.
This practice enables us to comment on changes in the Bank of Canada’s target
at particular points in time during our sample. But there is also a disadvantage
to using a rolling sample, because Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions is a
large sample test, and our rolling samples are necessarily smaller than the full sam-
ple. The degree of consistency between the results obtained by our two approaches
(rolling samples and full sample) will provide an indication of the size of distortion
present in the tests based on rolling samples.
Suppose we wish to test whether the Bank of Canada targets core inﬂation to
equal 2 percent. We would then construct the variable representing deviations from
target as
ut = GCPIXt − 2 (9)
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and compute Hansen’s test statistic u′ZWZ ′u, where
Zt = {GRGDPt−j , ...,GRGDPt−j−k,CPt−j , ...,CPt−j−k,GM1t−j , ...,GM1t−j−k,
GCPIXt−j , ...,GCPIXt−j−k}, (10)
j is the number of lags at which the policy instrument has an impact on GCPIX, k
is the number of lags on all of the explanatory variables that will be included in the
Bank’s information set, and W is a weighting matrix. In the case of rolling samples,
we use W = (Z ′Z)−1 due to degrees of freedom constraints, but when we estimate
on the full sample, we use instead the Newey-West variance-covariance estimator
that is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, allowing for MA(1) errors.
Strictly, the errors are likely to be distributed as an MA(j − 1); however degrees of
freedom limit our ability to fully model these.
Hansen’s test statistic is distributed asymptotically as χ24k under the null hy-
pothesis that u and Z are uncorrelated, where 4k is the number of overidentifying
restrictions in this case. This test can be completed for each rolling sample, with a
plot of the test statistics over time indicating movements by the Bank of Canada
towards or away from this hypothesised target.
When we test over the full sample, we will allow for up to 2 endogenous break-
points using the Sup-W test of Andrews (1993). This is computed as
SupW = maxπT
[u′u− u1′u1 − u2′u2
u1′u1 + u2′u2
]
, (11)
where u is a T × 1 vector of deviations from the target over the full sample, u1 is a
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T ∗× 1 vector from the ﬁrst sub-sample, u2 is a (T −T ∗)× 1 vector from the second
sub-sample, π = T ∗/T , and π ∈ [0.15, 0.85].
We also compare the estimated break dates with the dates of announcements
by the Bank of Canada using conﬁdence intervals as in Bai (1997). Given estimated
inﬂation targets for two adjacent sub-samples of Xˆ1 and Xˆ2, a conﬁdence interval
can be constructed as
(Tˆ ∗ − c/Λˆ− 1, Tˆ ∗ + c/Λˆ + 1), (12)
where
Λˆ =
(Xˆ1 − Xˆ2)2
1
T [
∑T
t=1 
2
t +
∑L
l=1
∑T
t=l+1
2l
L+1tt−l(D1,tD1,t−l + D2,tD2,t−l)]
, (13)
and
t = GCPIXt − Xˆ1D1,t − Xˆ2D2,t, (14)
where D1,t and D2,t are dummy variables that correspond with each of the sub-
samples, Tˆ ∗ is the estimated break date, and c = 11 is consistent with a 95% con-
ﬁdence interval. A conﬁdence interval constructed in this fashion incorporates the
Newey-West (1987) variance-covariance estimator to accommodate autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity.
One remaining issue is how to choose j, the length of time required for the
working of the monetary transmission mechanism. There is probably no single lag
length at which monetary policy impacts the economy, but a complete distribution
of lags. The Bank would wish to operate with the smallest feasible lag length for
the control of the economy, since the longer it waits, the more information it has
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available when it sets its instrument. But there is a danger that operating on too
short a lag length may cause “instrument instability”. Consider a simple example,
where monetary policy aﬀects inﬂation at two lag lengths, but where it is twice
as powerful at the longer lag length. If the Bank operates only on the shorter lag
length, the required oscillations in the interest rate in response to a one-time shock
would double every period. Unfortunately, a full examination of what determines
the shortest feasible lag length (and not subject to instrument instability) is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Our results will depend on our choice of j: if we choose a j that is too large,
our test will be biased towards not rejecting the null hypothesis. If j is too small,
our test will be biased towards rejecting the null hypothesis. We consider values of
j equal to 6 and 8 quarters, consistent with the predominant view within the Bank
of Canada, and we also describe the extent to which our results are sensitive to the
choice of lag length.
4. Results
We will now discuss the results for a number of hypothesised policy targets for
core inﬂation and real output, ﬁrst on rolling samples and then over the full sample.
We will outline the estimation and results for each in turn.
4.1 Inﬂation Targeting
Inﬂation targeting is consistent with the stated policy objectives of the Bank of
Canada over the past 10 years. In January 1988, the Bank’s Governor John Crow
(1988) made it clear in the Hansen Lecture that the longer-run objective of monetary
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policy should be price stability. In February 1991, this was formalised when the
Federal Government and the Bank of Canada jointly announced explicit inﬂation
targets for reducing the rate of inﬂation towards 2 percent, with a target range of
± 1 percent. Figure 1 contains the oﬃcial inﬂation targets and realised inﬂation;
vertical bars indicate the timing of the Hansen Lecture and the announcement of
targets.
Although the oﬃcial announcement committed the Bank to a target range for
inﬂation, our test focuses on particular point targets, with special interest in the
mid-point of that target range. We do this partly for simplicity, because testing
hypotheses about a target range would involve some complicated non-linear econo-
metrics. But we also think our approach may be realistic, because if the Bank has
imperfect control over inﬂation, then the best way for the Bank to keep inﬂation
from wandering outside that range my be to target some inﬂation rate point strictly
inside the allowed range. If the Bank’s loss function is symmetric, the best point to
target would be the mid-point. On the other hand, if the Bank was more concerned
about inﬂation rising above the target range than falling below it, the Bank may
well target an inﬂation rate below the mid-point of the range.
First we consider a test of the announced target since targets ﬁrst came into
eﬀect in the fourth quarter of 1992; the results are contained in the ﬁrst row of
Table 1. The test statistic for overidentifying restrictions (19.15) cannot be rejected
at usual signiﬁcance levels. Therefore the announced target for monetary policy
cannot be rejected empirically.
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As an alternative, consider a target of core inﬂation equal to 2 percent, which
is consistent with the Bank of Canada’s stated target since the end of 1995. Figure
2A contains test statistics for the hypothesis of inﬂation targeting as outlined in the
previous section. These are asymptotically χ2-distributed tests of the hypothesis
that none of the variables included in the Bank of Canada’s information set explain
deviations of GCPIX from the target. The horizontal dotted lines represent the
nominal critical values at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively, and the
dates on the horizontal axis are the ﬁrst quarterly observation included in the rolling
sample; the ﬁnal observation is 36 quarters, or 9 years, later.
Rolling samples that include more quarters since explicit inﬂation targets were
announced by the Bank have higher p-values, and therefore indicate less evidence
against the null hypothesis. When all recent data are included, an inﬂation target of
2 percent cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level of signiﬁcance- even though some
of the observations included in the regression predate an explicit inﬂation target of
2%. Figure 2B demonstrates that very similar results can be obtained assuming a
transmission mechanism lag length of 6 quarters (j = 6).
To illustrate that our test is suﬃciently powerful to discriminate between al-
ternative targeting hypotheses, Figure 2C contains the test statistics for a null
hypothesis of an inﬂation target of 4 percent, for j = 8. While this null hypothesis
cannot be rejected for a small number of samples starting in the early 1980s, it is
rejected when most of the quarters in the regression are from the explicit inﬂation-
targeting period. Similarly, an inﬂation target of 1 percent (not shown) can be
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rejected for all periods.
As an alternative objective, consider the hypothesis that the Bank of Canada
targets core inﬂation to equal its recent past values, deﬁned here as a 20-quarter
moving average so that temporary deviations in inﬂation have only a small impact
on the target. Figure 3A contains the test statistics. Around the middle of the
sample period, the test statistics decline substantially, suggesting that this hypoth-
esis becomes more plausible around this time, although there is evidence that the
monetary authority was not targeting core inﬂation to its recent past (as deﬁned
here) over the entire sample. This change (starting in the ﬁrst quarter of 1982 in
Figure 3A) may be due to the loss of old data from the rolling sample, or it may
be due to the addition of new data. To determine which of these is responsible, the
estimation is repeated twice, in one-sided rolling samples. First, the sample size
used for estimation starts with the full sample and becomes progressively smaller
as the earliest observation is dropped with each estimation, until only 36 observa-
tions remain (labeled “Dropping Data”). Second, the sample begins with the ﬁrst
36 observations and becomes progressively larger as one observation is added with
each estimation, until the full sample is included (labeled “Adding Data”).
Figure 3B contains the test statistics. In the case of adding data, the horizon-
tal axis represents the date of the ﬁnal observation included in the sample less 36
quarters. In the case of dropping data, the horizontal axis represents the earliest
observation included in the sample. The test statistics from the two-sided rolling
samples are also included as a point of reference. The large change in the test
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statistic in Figure 3A coincides with that obtained by dropping one observation
each quarter, and is therefore driven not by data from the early 1990s, when in-
ﬂation targets were announced, but by data from the early 1980s. In contrast, the
test statistic from adding one additional observation each regression remains high
throughout the sample period. Our results are therefore consistent with an accom-
modative monetary policy until the early 1980s, followed by an anti-inﬂationary
policy thereafter.5
We now consider estimation over the full sample, results from which are con-
tained in Table 1. First note that an inﬂation target of 2% over the full sample
can be rejected at the 5% level, implying that information available to the mone-
tary authority when policy was set is correlated with inﬂation deviations from 2%.
We next allow for an endogenously estimated inﬂation target. Our estimate of the
endogenous target is equal to the estimated constant using G.M.M. estimation, al-
lowing for robust variance-covariance computation and M.A.(1) errors using Newey
and West (1987).
Over the full sample, the best estimate of the inﬂation target is 4.42%, but this
estimate can nevertheless be rejected as an inﬂation target at the 1% level. Next we
provide for an endogenous-break point, allowing for a change in the target, using
the Sup-W test of Andrews (1993). This procedure yields a break at the end of 1983
that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Now estimating a target separately
over each of the two sub-samples, we get an estimated inﬂation target of 8.12%
for the ﬁrst period, which cannot be rejected, and an estimated inﬂation target of
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2.61% for the second period, which can be rejected at the 10% level. However,
there is a second statistically signiﬁcant break-point occurring at the end of the
ﬁrst quarter of 1991. Now estimating over the three sub-samples separately, we
have inﬂation targets of 8.12%, 4.11%, and 1.61% respectively, and none of these
can be rejected using tests of over-identifying restrictions. These therefore provide
valid point estimates of the inﬂation targets of monetary policy over each of the
respective periods.
In the above results we speciﬁed an inﬂation target deﬁned over a single quarter.
The remainder of Table 1 considers an inﬂation target speciﬁed as a four-quarter
moving average, followed by an eight-quarter moving average. These are consistent
with a monetary authority that desires stable inﬂation over a 1-year or 2-year hori-
zon respectively. Qualitatively the results obtained here are very similar to those
obtained above; in all cases, three distinct periods with diﬀerent inﬂation targets
are identiﬁed, with a successively lower target inﬂation rate estimated in each sub-
sequent period, that cannot be rejected using tests of over-identifying restrictions.
One slight diﬀerence is the point at which the latest, low inﬂation period is identiﬁed
to commence, varying from the second quarter of 1991 in the case of the quarterly
rate of inﬂation to the fourth quarter of 1991 in the case of an 8 quarter moving
average.
Constructing a 95% conﬁdence interval around the estimated break-point date,
this spans 1.7, 1.7, and 1.8 quarters each side of the point estimate for 1-quarter,
1-year, and 2-year horizon target respectively, assuming no serial correlation (L = 0
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in equation (13)). These reduce slightly to 1.5, 1.6, and 1.5 respectively, allowing
for 7-quarters of serial correlation. Thus with the exception of the 2-year horizon, a
95% conﬁdence interval contains the announcement of explicit inﬂation targets by
the Bank of Canada (February 1991).
Note here that the results obtained by our two approaches (rolling samples vs
full sample) are consistent, indicating that any size distortion introduced by the
small sample with the rolling sample approach is small.
4.2 Targeting Real GDP
We now consider hypotheses about possible monetary policy targets speciﬁed
in terms of real GDP. Consider ﬁrst the hypothesis that the Bank of Canada has
an objective that the economy continues to grow at recent historical levels, here
represented with a 20-quarter moving average. Figure 4 contains the test statistics
for the rolling sample approach, and shows that for all periods, this hypothesis
can be rejected. A second hypothesis, that the Bank of Canada targets potential
output, deﬁned using the internal measure of the Bank of Canada, in real time,
was also rejected using the rolling sample approach.6 However, neither of these
two hypothesised targets was ever rejected in the context of full-sample estimation,
with or without endogenous break-points. Further investigation revealed that the
inconsistency between the results from the two approaches (rolling sample versus
full sample) stems from diﬀerences in the size of the estimated variance-covariance
matrix. Indeed, utilizing the Newey-West robust variance-covariance matrix results
in insigniﬁcant overidentifying test statistics in Figure 4 for all rolling samples. We
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interpret these results as evidence of some degree of output targeting by the Bank
of Canada over the full sample period.
5. Conclusions
We have developed and implemented a method to test hypotheses about what
it is a policy authority is targeting. Our method focuses on the idea that the
deviations between the actual outcomes and the intended target of a rational policy
authority should be uncorrelated with the policy authority’s information set when
it sets its instrument. We have also shown in passing that commonly used empirical
causality tests are of dubious value in detecting causal relationships between policy
instruments and policy targets.
In February 1991, the Federal Government and the Bank of Canada jointly
announced a sequence of explicit targets for inﬂation. We have shown that the date
of the announcement approximately coincided with an actual change in monetary
policy. We can reject the hypothesis that the Bank was targeting low inﬂation
before 1991, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that it was targeting its announced
inﬂation targets thereafter. By our test, the policy announcement reﬂected a change
in actual policy. The Bank has done exactly what it said it would do.
Some caveats are of course in order. We have jointly tested rational expecta-
tions on the part of the policymaker, and our hypothesis about the lag length in the
transmission mechanism with which the instrument inﬂuences the target variable,
along with our main hypothesis about the policymaker’s target. If either of the
ﬁrst two assumptions is incorrect, our test will be biased. Also, monetary author-
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ities may well have multiple objectives in practice, whereas our test requires that
the target be a scalar variable. For a policymaker with ﬁxed weights on multiple
objectives, and facing a ﬁxed trade-oﬀ between them, it may be possible to convert
multiple objectives into a single scalar target, in which case our test can be imple-
mented as it stands. But otherwise, the extension of our test to consider the case
of multiple competing objectives must be left for future research.
21
References
Andrews, Donald W. K. (1993) “Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural
Change with Unknown Change Point,” Econometrica 61(4), 821-56
Bai, Jushan (1997) “Estimation of a Change Point in Multiple Regression Models,”
Review of Economics and Statistics 79(4), 551-63
Bernanke, Ben S. and Ilian Mihov (1997) “What does the Bundesbank Target?”
European Economic Review 41(6), 1025-53
Bernanke, Ben S. and Ilian Mihov (1998) “Measuring Monetary Policy,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 113(3), 869-902
Buiter, Willem H. (1984) “Granger-Causality and Policy Eﬀectiveness,” Economica
51(202), 151-62
Butler, Leo (1996) “The Bank of Canada’s New Quarterly Projection Model (QPM)
Part 4: A Semi-Structural Method to Estimate Potential Output: Combin-
ing Economic Theory with a Time-Series Filter,” Bank of Canada, Technical
Report No. 77
Cecchetti, Stephen G., Margaret M. McConnell and Gabriel Perez Quiros (1999)
“Policymakers’ Revealed Preferences and the Output-Inﬂation Variability
Trade-oﬀ: Implications for the European System of Central Banks,” Federal
Reserve Bank of New York
Cecchetti, Stephen G. and Michael Ehrmann (1999) “Does Inﬂation Targeting In-
crease Output Volatility? An International Comparison of Policymakers’ Pref-
erences and Outcomes,” NBER Working Paper No. 7426
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler (1998) “Monetary Policy Rules in
Practice: Some International Evidence,” European Economic Review 42(6),
1033-67
Crow, John (1998) “The Work of Canadian Monetary Policy,” Bank of Canada
Review (February), 3-17
Favero, Carlo A. and Riccardo Rovelli (1999) “Modelling and Identifying Central
Banks’ Preferences,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper
No. 2178
Hall, Robert E. (1978) “Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income
Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy 86(6), 971-
87
Hansen, Lars P. (1982) “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Mo-
ments Estimators,” Econometrica 50(4), 1029-54
Kuttner, Kenneth N. and Adam S. Posen (1999) “Does Talk Matter After All?
Inﬂation Targeting and Central Bank Behavior,” Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, Staﬀ Report No. 88
Newey, Whitney K. and Kenneth D. West (1987) “A Simple, Positive Semi-Deﬁnite,
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix,”
Econometrica 55(3), 703-08
Swank, Otto H. and Job Swank (1993) “In Search of the Motives Behind U.S. Fiscal
Macroeconomic Policy,” Applied Economics 25(8), 1013-22
Thornton, Daniel L. (1999) “The Fed’s Inﬂuence on the Federal Funds Rate: Is
It Open Market or Open Mouth Operations?” Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, Working Paper No. 99-022A
Footnotes
Lead footnote. Rowe: Economics Department, Carleton University, Ottawa, On-
tario, Canada K1S 5B6, (613) 520-2600 ext. 3773, nick rowe@carleton.ca;
Yetman: School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Pok-
fulam Road, Hong Kong, (852) 2857-8506, jyetman@econ.hku.hk. We thank
seminar participants at the Bank of Canada and Carleton for their comments,
and two anonymous referees for comments that substantially improved the pa-
per. Frederick Beauregard-Tellier provided excellent research assistance. All
remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility.
1. For example, Thornton (1999) documents evidence from FOMC transcripts
that the Federal Reserve started targeting the Federal Funds Rate in 1982,
although their oﬃcial stated target was Borrowed Reserves until 1989. He
argues that this discrepancy was due to political considerations.
2. For example, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) or Bernanke and Mihov
(1997).
3. For example, see Swank and Swank (1993), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Favero
and Rovelli (1999), Cecchetti, McConnell and Perez Quiros (1999), or Cechetti
and Ehrmann (1999).
4. Buiter (1984) makes a similar point.
5. Because the horizontal axis represents the end of the sample less 36 quarters,
test statistics after the ﬁrst quarter of 1982 include information from the
inﬂation targeting period.
6. This measure combines economic structure with a time-series ﬁlter, and is de-
scribed in Butler (1996). The ﬁlter was run recursively, with the last data
point at each recursion used to construct the series. Since only contempora-
neous or lagged data are used at each recursion, it is eﬀectively a one-sided
ﬁlter, and in that sense may be thought of as a real-time measure of potential
output. Note however that revised data are used, rather than the original
data that were available to the monetary authority at the time to formulate
monetary policy.
Table 1. Full Sample Results.
Sample Coeﬃcient (s.e.) O.I.R. Statistic d.f. signiﬁcance
[ SupW statistic π signiﬁcance† ]
Stated Inﬂation Target
1992:4 - 2001:1 n.a. 19.15 20 0.51
Inﬂation Target of 2%
1971:2 - 2001:1 n.a. 31.36 20 0.05
Endogenous Inﬂation Target
1971:2 - 2001:1 4.42 (0.29) 37.46 19 0.01
[ 204.31 0.49 *** ]
1971:2 - 1982:4 8.12 (0.17) 16.97 19 0.59
1983:1 - 2001:1 2.61 (0.17) 27.73 19 0.09
[ 34.26 0.77 *** ]
1971:2 - 1982:4 8.12 (0.17) 16.97 19 0.59
1983:1 - 1991:1 4.11 (0.09) 13.32 19 0.82
1991:2 - 2001:1 1.61 (0.09) 14.73 19 0.74
Endogenous Inﬂation Target: M.A.(4)
1971:2 - 2001:1 4.36 (0.28) 35.62 19 0.01
[ 251.56 0.51 *** ]
1971:2 - 1983:2 7.93 (0.19) 17.99 19 0.52
1983:3 - 2001:1 2.64 (0.17) 28.69 19 0.07
[ 46.62 0.78 *** ]
1971:2 - 1982:4 8.02 (0.19) 17.12 19 0.58
1983:1 - 1991:2 4.15 (0.04) 10.80 19 0.93
1991:3 - 2001:1 1.62 (0.02) 16.42 19 0.63
Endogenous Inﬂation Target: M.A.(8)
1971:2 - 2001:1 4.46 (0.27) 35.34 19 0.01
[ 284.18 0.51 *** ]
1971:2 - 1983:2 7.96 (0.18) 17.58 19 0.55
1983:3 - 2001:1 2.79 (0.19) 29.48 19 0.06
[ 52.54 0.78 *** ]
1971:2 - 1983:1 7.96 (0.17) 17.55 19 0.55
1983:2 - 1991:3 4.10 (0.05) 14.32 19 0.76
1991:4 - 2001:1 1.63 (0.03) 12.64 19 0.86
† Signiﬁcance levels from Andrews (1993), Table 1: 10% (*); 5% (**); 1% (***)
Figure 1: Inflation and official targets
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Figure 2A: Targeting core inflation of 2%
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Figure 2B: Targeting core inflation of 2%
j=6 quarters
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Figure 2C: Targeting core inflation of 4%
j=8 quarters
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Figure 3A: Targeting core inflation equal to its recent past
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Figure 3B: Targeting core inflation equal to its recent past
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Figure 4: Targeting recent growth rates
j=8 quarters
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